In contrast to the enormous advances made in cryptographic technology over the last 40 years, there have been correspondingly few advances in anonymizing channels. This lag in advances is due the technical challenge of constructing a provably secure, yet practical, solution to the problem. While practical approaches, such as the widely used Tor network, have not been proven to be secure; provably secure approaches in the academic literature are not exible or scalable enough to be used widely in real systems.
INTRODUCTION
Tor is a widely used anonymity network for hiding user identities and locations [10, 11] . According to current statistics published by The Tor Project, Inc., Tor is used by hundreds of thousands of users to add privacy to their communications. To use Tor's services, a client rst downloads Tor's client software which allows the client's applications running the Socket Secure (SOCKS) protocol to con gure its tra c to the interface. The software can then connect the client to one of seven directory authorities, providing the client with a list of available volunteer-run Tor relay-nodes. Tor achieves some level of privacy by routing messages through three Tor relay-nodes: an entry node, an intermediary node, and an exit node. By using a layered encryption technique, each node in the path observes only the tra c on links adjacent to it as opposed to on the entire routing path [18] . While Tor's exible architecture makes for a practical and usable system, modeling Tor's privacy settings has been challenging; and a formal proof of why (and under which settings) Tor is secure has so far eluded the security research community.
On the ip side, researchers have known about provably secure methods which are too impractical in real systems. For example, Racko and Simon [22] and Raymond [23] pointed out that perfect secrecy can be achieved by broadcasting every message, thereby adding a linear (in the size of the network) redundancy.
Our contributions
In this paper, we present three scalable and provably secure peerto-peer messaging protocols. Our solutions are more e cient and robust because, as in the Tor network, they are onion-routing protocols [6] with dynamic routing, by which we mean that the packet routes are not xed in advance but are chosen independently at random by the individual users.
In analyzing our solutions, we consider two de nitions of privacy. Statistical privacy means that an adversary's view of the protocol does not reveal, in the statistical sense, anything about who is talking to whom. It is a very strong notion and is known to be impossible to satisfy in many circumstances. For example, in order to statistically hide the fact that Alice is downloading a movie from Bob, the communication complexity of any protocol would have to ensure that Alice receives, and Bob sends, enough bits to t a movie, and that is expensive. Di erential privacy means that the protocol does not reveal much, in the statistical sense, about which one of two possible neighboring sets of inputs the communicating parties have received; it other words, the view the adversary gets when Alice sends a short message to Bob is close to when Alice sends a short message to Carol. These de nitions are relatively standard, although our versions of them (given in Section 2) are tailored to anonymity protocols speci cally.
Our solutions are for the following standard adversary models, in increasing order of capabilities:
• Network adversary. A network adversary can observe the bits owing on every link of the network. (Note that if the peer-to-peer links are encrypted in an idealized sense, then the only information that the adversary can use is the volume ow.) • Passive adversary. In addition to the capabilities of a network adversary, a passive adversary can observe the internal states and operations of a set of nodes it chooses to adaptively corrupt. • Active adversary. In addition to the capabilities of a network adversary, an active adversary can control a set of nodes it chooses to adaptively corrupt. The adversary can 1 choose the behavior of these nodes to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
Privacy against network adversaries. We present a rst solution, Π 1 , and we prove that it achieves statistical security against network adversaries when each user is conversing with at most one other user and is sending xed-length messages. The solution is based on an e cient oblivious permutation protocol [21] .
Privacy against passive adversaries. We rst prove that any efcient messaging protocol with at most logarithmic depth (in the network size) cannot be secure against a passive adversary capable of corrupting a constant fraction of the network (Thm. 8.1). In particular, this implies that packet padding (the method of Protocol Π 1 ) cannot be used to reduce the protocol delay to a constant number.
We consider a second solution, Π 2 , and prove that it is secure against passive adversaries (again, when each user is conversing with at most one other user, and message lengths are all the same), capable of adaptively corrupting any fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network. The approach here is to choose each intermediary hop of each onion route (each of poly-logarithmic length), independently and uniformly at random. While this general approach is not new, no rigorous proof of security existed. By proving that Π 2 is secure, we identify, for the rst time, a family of Tor-like protocols that is provably secure.
Privacy against active adversaries. We prove that, while e cient, Π 2 does not provide privacy against active adversaries capable of corrupting a non-negligible portion of the network (Thm. 8.2) . To that end, we present an e cient protocol (a modi ed Tor-like protocol with additional structure), which we prove to be di erentially private against active adversaries capable of adaptively corrupting any constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network.
Here, importantly, our analysis no longer requires that a user be conversing with at most one other user. The message lengths are still xed. This way, for example, the scenario where Alice is downloading a movie can be captured by breaking the movie up into a sequence of messages, each of the prescribed length. So the scenario in which Alice downloads the movie from Bob is a neighbor (for the purposes of di erential privacy) of the scenario in which she is downloading a slightly shorter movie from Bob, but not a neighbor of the scenario in which she is downloading the movie from Carol. Vuvuzela. Recently, van den Hoo et al. proposed the Vuvuzela protocol, which uses a di erentially private mechanism for hiding the metadata leakage in a mix-cascade network [25] . This is a novel usage of di erential privacy as it marks one of the rst occurrences where a di erentially private mechanism is deliberately used for sealing metadata leakages. The idea of using a di erential privacy mechanism within an anonymity protocol is meaningful, since showing that the protocol achieves di erential privacy implies that local behaviors of any participant are loosely equiprobable.
Related work
Vuvuzela's security relies on using onion routing on a static mix-cascade architecture which (without server dummy onions) is claimed to reveal only the number of conversing participants, and a provably di erentially private mechanism is used to hide this remaining variable. At the heart of Vuvuzela's construction is a xed sequence of servers used by all participating parties. Thus, the solution is scalable only in applications with comparatively low load, e.g., in a text-messaging systems with very short messages. While van den Hoo et al.'s Vuvuzela solution is not loadbalanced and uses static routing [25] , our solutions are all properly load-balanced and uses dynamic routing.
Other related work. To motivate their work, van den Hoo et al. noted that prior anonymity solutions tended to fall into one of two categories: unscalable solutions with rigorous security, including Dissent [26] and Riposte [8] ; and practical solutions with weak security, like Crowds [24] and Tor [10] .
Prior anonymity protocols with provable security tend to rely on heavy cryptographic machinery to achieve high security standards. Racko and Simon's 1993 paper o ers the closest solution to ours. Like us, Racko and Simon show their solution is secure by proving a rapid convergence of Markov processes. Unlike our approach, an in exible network architecture is used to make their security argument tractable. Additionally, Racko and Simon use secure multiparty computation (SMPC) for providing security against active adversaries. Thus, while Racko and Simon's solution for passive adversaries [22] was shown to have a short O(log 2 n) delay in a later paper by Czumaj [9] , their main protocol [22] relies heavily on SMPC and is believed not to scale [23] . Another earlier example of an anonymity protocol that uses SMPC but with a much narrower purpose, is the dining cryptographer's protocol, which Chaum rst introduced as a means to study secure multiparty Boolean-OR computation [5] . Other related cryptographic tools used in constructing anonymity protocols include oblivious RAM (ORAM) and private information retrieval (PIR) [7, 8] . Corrigan-Gibbs et al.'s Riposte solution makes use of a global bulletin board and has a latency of a couple of days [8] .
Comparatively, the only cryptographic primitives used in our constructions are a public-key encryption scheme and a pseudorandom function (PRF). Compared with earlier solutions designed to be secure against active adversaries, our protocol, Π 3 , is arguably a more practical approach with added scalability from proper loadbalancing and exibility from dynamic routing, see Table 1 .
Information-theoretically secure approaches provide alternatives to provably secure methods. results for the network and passive adversaries are given in Sections 4 and 5, and our results for the active adversaries are given in Section 6. In Section 7, we describe the implications of using standard computationally secure cryptographic encryption in place of idealized encryption in our constructions. We provide concluding remarks in Sections 8 and 9.
DEFINITIONS
A cryptographic onion [6] is, essentially, a message wrapped in several layers of encryption. An onion is created on a quadruple input, a message m, a recipient P r , a routing path through the intermediaries P o 1 , . . . , P o L , and the public keys associated with all these parties. The inner-most layer contains the recipient P r (i.e., the nal destination of the onion) and an encryption of m under the public key of P r . All other (intermediary) layers contain a next destination P o i from the routing path and an onion to be routed to P o i , which is a message encrypted under the public key of P o i . By a mixnode, we mean a node in a network that receives multiple onions at once, learns the next destinations of the onions by decrypting the outer-most layers of the onions, and sends the "peeled" onions to their next destinations in random order.
Setting. We abstract away many of the attributes of the physical network and instead assume a complete communication graph; i.e., we assume that every pair of participants is connected by an edge. We further assume a standard model for communication [14] , where time is partitioned into even intervals or rounds, and protocols progress in these rounds.
A node is either a user client or a server that serves as a mixnode. We let U = {U 1 , . . . , U N } denote the set of users, and S = {S 1 , . . . , S n } the set of servers, where generally N > n. M denotes the message space. A pair (m, j) is properly formed if m ∈ M and j ∈ [N ]. The input to each user U i is a collection M i of properly formed pairs, where (m, j) ∈ M i means that user U i intends on sending message m to recipient U j . The servers are helper nodes without inputs or outputs.
Our solutions make use of an idealized public-key encryption scheme AE = (Gen, Enc, Dec). We assume each party X is associated with a unique identity, a secret key sk X , and a properly registered public key pk X ; and that the key pair (sk X , pk X ) was generated using the key generating algorithm Gen.
We assume an idealized version of an encryption scheme, in which the ciphertexts are information-theoretically unrelated to the plaintexts that they encrypt and reveal nothing but the length of the plaintext. (Obviously, such encryption schemes do not exist computationally, but only in a hybrid model with an oracle that realizes an ideal encryption functionality, such as that of Canetti [3] .) When used in forming onions, such an encryption scheme gives rise to onions that are information-theoretically independent of their contents, destinations, and identities of the mix-nodes. We use this idealized encryption in giving the initial analysis of our construction in Sections 4-6. Our real-life proposal, of course, will use standard computationally secure encryption [15] . We discuss the implications of this in Section 7.
Views and outputs. Let Π be a protocol, and let σ be a vector of inputs to Π. Given an adversary A, the view V Π, A (σ ) of A is its observables from participating in protocol Π on input σ , plus any randomness used to make its decisions. With idealized secure peer-to-peer links, the observables for a network adversary are the tra c volumes on all links; whereas for the passive and active adversaries, the observables additionally include the internal states of all corrupted nodes at all times.
Given an adversary A, the output O Π, A (σ ) of protocol Π on input σ is a vector of outputs for the N users. 2.1 (S [15] ). An anonymity protocol Π with inputted security parameter λ ∈ N, achieves statistical privacy from an adversary A for an input set Σ if, for any two inputs σ 0 , σ 1 ∈ Σ, such that σ 0 and σ 1 di er only on the honest users' inputs, A's views V A, Π (σ 0 ) and V A, Π (σ 1 ) on the two inputs are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
where λ is the security parameter of the system, and ∆(·, ·) denotes statistical distance (i.e., total variation distance). Π is perfectly secure if the statistical distance is zero instead.
Let σ 0 and σ 1 be two input vectors. They are neighboring if, except for one (honest) user U , every user's input in σ 0 is identical to its input in σ 1 ; and, letting U 's inputs in σ 0 and σ 1 be ). An anonymity protocol Π achieves (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy from an adversary A for an input set Σ if, for any two neighboring inputs σ 0 , σ 1 ∈ Σ, A's views V A, Π (σ 0 ) and V A, Π (σ 1 ) on the two inputs are approximately equiprobable. More precisely, for any set of outcomes V,
A protocol that uses cryptographic tools like public-key encryption and authentication can only be di erentially private when idealized versions of the tools are used. In practice, the best we can achieve is the computational analogue. The computational analogue for (ϵ, δ )-DP that we will use in this paper is the following de nition from Mironov et al. [19] : [19] ). An anonymity protocol Π with inputted security parameter λ ∈ N, is ϵ-IND-CDP for an input set Σ λ if, for any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary {A λ } λ ∈N , for any two polynomially-sized neighboring inputs σ 0, λ , σ 1, λ ∈ Σ λ , and any polynomially-sized advice string z λ , A's views V A, Π λ (σ 0, λ ) and V A, Π λ (σ 1, λ ) on the two inputs are computationally approximately equiprobable, i.e.,
PRELIMINARIES
By the notation [n], we mean the set of integers {1, . . . , n}. The output a of an algorithm A is denoted by a ← A. For a set S, we write s ← S to represent that s is a random sample from the set S and |S | to represent its cardinality. A realization d of a distribution D is denoted d ∼ D; i.e., by d ∼ Poisson(λ), we mean that d is a realization of a Poisson random variable with rate λ, and by d ∼ Binomial(N , p), we mean that d is a realization of a binomial random variable with parameters N and p. By log(n), we mean the logarithm of n base 2; and by ln(n), we mean the natural log of n. A function f : R → R is negligible in n (written f (n) = negl(n)), if for every polynomial p(·) and all su ciently large n, f (n) < 1/p(n). When n is the security parameter, we say that an event occurs with overwhelming probability if it is a subset of the complement of the union of all events with probability negligible in n. We use the standard notion of a pseudorandom function [15, Ch. 3.6].
Useful facts
We make use of the following facts derived from Cherno bounds, which allow us to make the arguments that certain favorable events occur with overwhelming probability as opposed to merely occurring in expectation. 3.1. Suppose α(n) · n log 2 n balls are thrown uniformly at random into n bins, where α(n) = Ω(1), 0 < δ < 1, and 0 ≤ ν < 1.
a. The probability that there exists a bin with more than α(n) · (1 + δ ) log 2 n balls or less than α(n) · (1 − δ ) log 2 n balls is negligible in n. b. The probability that there exists a set of ⌊kn⌋ bins that contains more than α(n) · (1 + δ )kn log 2 n balls or less than α(n) · (1 − δ )kn log 2 n balls is negligible in n.
, let O i denote the number of balls in bin i. The probability that the number of balls in a xed bin i ∈ [n] is signi cantly more or less than the expected number of balls can be bounded by a Cherno bound [20, Cor. 4.6] :
So, by the union bound, the probability that any bin has signicantly more or less than the expected number of balls is negligible in n:
(of b.) We prove this by contradiction. We assume the di erence between the actual number of balls in ⌊νn⌋ bins and the expected number of balls in ⌊νn⌋ bins can exceed δνn log 2 n with non-negligible probability. By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a bin such that the di erence between the actual number of balls its holds and the expected number of balls for a single bin exceeds δ log 2 n. This contradicts Fact 3.1a.
Azuma-Hoe ding inequality
The proof of Lemma 6.1 makes use of the Azuma-Hoe ding inequality [20, Thm. 12.4 ], which we include here for convenience.
. is a martingale if, for all i ≥ 0, the following conditions are satis ed: . Let the sequence of random variables X 0 , X 1 , . . . be a martingale, where for every i > 0,
for any j > 0 and λ > 0, 4
SECURITY AGAINST NETWORK ADVERSARIES
Our rst construction Π 1 is an adaptation of Ohrimenko et al.'s e cient oblivious permutation protocol [21] . We consider the case where every user is conversing with at most one other user. We let U = {U 1 , . . . , U n 2 } denote the set of users, and let S = {S 1 , . . . , S n } denote the set of servers. Every user U i ∈ U constructs an onion with a routing path of length 3, where the rst 2 hops (the intermediary nodes) are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set S of servers. If U i is conversing with another user U j ∈ U, the innermost layer of the onion is an encrypted message for U j . If the user is not conversing with anyone, the innermost layer is an encryption of ⊥ for the sender itself.
All onions are released simultaneously. Each rst-hop server S i peels o the outermost layer of its received onions and creates a packet of size k = α log n onions for each second-hop server S j , consisting of all onions for S j plus dummy onions as required. 1 Every second-hop server S j peels o the outermost layers of its received onions, drops the dummy onions, and sends the real onions to their intended recipients in random order. Precise user and server procedures for Protocol Π 1 are provided in Algorithms 1 and 2 below. Clearly, Π 1 is correct.
(m) 2:
for all i from 3 to 1 do // Onion wrap the (padded) message m 6:
end for 8: Send onion e 0 [0] = Enc(pk T 1 , e 1 ) to server e 0 [1] = T 0 9:
Upon receiving an encrypted message e back from some server T , decrypt message: d = Dec(pk U i , e) 10: end procedure ; it is given in Appendix A. 1 In the unlikely event that the server needs to send more than α log n onions to some recipient, the packet size will be higher. This event is unlikely because each user is conversing with at most one other user, and the routes are picked independently. In the network adversary model, all users and servers are honest. Algorithm 2 Procedure for a server S i .
for all onion e ∈ E do // Decrypt outer layer of onions 3 :
end for 5:
if the messages not dummies then 6: send each (real) message to its intended recipient in random order 7: else // The messages are for servers 8: for all server S j ∈ S do 9:
Create a packet of size k onions 10: if there are less than k onions are for S j then 11: then pad with dummy onions 12: end if 13: Send each packet to its intended recipient server 14: end for 15: end if 16: end procedure
SECURITY AGAINST PASSIVE ADVERSARIES
We now present our second protocol, Π 2 , which we prove to be secure against passive adversaries. Protocol Π 2 has the added bene t of reducing the load on each server compared with Π 1 in the network adversary model. 2 We consider again the case where every user is conversing with at most one other user, but our security proof easily extends to all input vectors where every sender sends the same number of onions, and every receiver receives the same number of onions.
Protocol Π 2 works as follows: Let U = {U 1 , . . . , U N } be the set of users, and S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }, the set of servers. Every user U i ∈ U, conversing with another user, chooses a sequence of L servers for its onion route, where each hop is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set S of servers. U i then creates an onion where the innermost layer is an encrypted message for the intended recipient U j ∈ U and the outer layers are speci ed by the chosen sequence of L servers, see Algorithm 3. If U i is not conversing with anyone, the innermost layer is an encryption of ⊥ for the sender itself. As before, all onions are released simultaneously at the beginning of the protocol run. Every server S i decrypts the outermost layer of the received onions and sends the peeled onion to their labeled destinations in random order, see Algorithm 4. Clearly, Π 2 is correct.
We rst prove that Π 2 achieves privacy in the network adversary model, and then show that it also achieves privacy in the passive adversary model. 5.1. For N n = Ω(log 2 n), and L = Ω(log 2 n), protocol Π 2 provides statistical privacy against any network adversary on input set Σ, consisting of all input vectors where every user is conversing with at most one other user. 2 In Π 1 , each server sends α √ N log √ N onions per round, where N is the number of users. In Π 2 , the load per server per round is poly-logarithmic in the number N of users.
Algorithm 3 Procedure for a client U i in a conversation with client U j 1: procedure Π 2 .
(m) 2: for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} do 3:
for all ℓ from L to 0 do // Onion wrap the (padded) message m 7:
Send onion e 0 [0] = Enc(pk T 1 , e 1 ) to server e 0 [1] = T 1 10: Upon receiving an encrypted message e back from some server T , decrypt message: d = Dec(pk U i , e) 11: end procedure Algorithm 4 Procedure for a server S i .
for all received onion e do // Decrypt all onions received in the current step 3 :
end for 5: Send the peeled onions to their labeled destinations in random order 6: end procedure P
. Let A be any network adversary, and let U ∈ U be any target sender. Because A observes every link of the network, A observes the rst hop taken by U 's onion at step 1 and knows with certainty, where U 's onion is at this point in time. Let S be this location (i.e., server). At the next step, all the onions that were routed to S at the previous step, emerge from S and are routed to their next destinations, each, from A's perspective, having an equal 1 k probability of being U 's onion, where k denotes the total number of onions that were routed to S at step 1. Continuing with this analysis, from A's perspective, the location of U 's onion becomes progressively more uncertain with every step of the protocol. Below, we show that after a poly-logarithmic number of steps, A's belief of the location of U 's onion is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over the n possible locations.
Let N n = α log 2 n; so that after each step, every location receives α log 2 n onions in expectation. We recast our problem as a balls-inbins problem, where the balls are the onions, and the bins, the locations. At every step of the protocol, all αn log 2 n balls (i.e., onions) are thrown uniformly at random into n bins (i.e., each onion is routed to one of n locations, independently and uniformly at random).
Fix any target sender U , and let X t denote the random variable representing A's belief of the location of U 's ball after t steps (and before step t + 1). The distribution dist(X t ) of X t is over the n bins; and for every i ∈ [n], let b t i denote the bin with the largest probability mass in dist(X t ). So, b t 1 , b t 2 , . . . , b t n denotes the probability masses of dist(X t ) in decreasing order.
WLOG, we assume that n is divisible by n. We partition the bins into 3 groups G t 1 , G t 2 , and G t 3 ; such that G t 1 contains all the balls in the top 1 3 
; G t 3 contains all the balls in the bottom 1 3 
, . . . , b t n ; and G t 2 contains all the balls in the remaining bins b t
.
For each j ∈ [3] , let O t j ∈ G t j be a ball with the maximum probability of being U 's onion among the balls in group G t j . For any d ∈ (0, 1) , let d ′ = 1 − 1 1+d . The bin c t j , that contains O t j , contains at least (1 − d ′ )α log 2 n balls (Fact 3.1a). It follows that,
with overwhelming probability. The number of balls contained in each group G t j is arbitrarily close to the expected number α 3 n log 2 n of balls in a group (Fact 3.1b). Thus, combined with Fact 3.1a, the most probable bin b t +1 1 after the next step receives at most (1+d )α 3 log 2 n of balls from each of the 3 groups G t 1 , G t 2 , and G t 3 . From (1), this implies that, with overwhelming probability,
Using a symmetric argument, we can conclude that, with overwhelming probability,
as the di erence in probabilities between the most and least probable bins at step t.
where the last inequality follows from telescopic cancelling, since
and
Thus, the di erence t is at least halved at every step. By step log 2 n, the di erence is negligible in n, and so the adversary's views from any two inputs are statistically indistinguishable.
In the proof above, the bins were partitioned into 3 groups at every step. We can partition the bins into any constant K number of groups instead and obtain a more general bound:
For any β > 0, by choosing an appropriately large K, we can show that Π 2 achieves statistical privacy after L = β log 2 n steps.
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, we showed that Π 2 is statistically secure against network adversaries by showing that the location of any sender's onion becomes progressively more uncertain with every step of the protocol. The proof relies on the fact that, at every step, every onion "mixes" with other onions.
In the passive adversary model, an onion still gets mixed with all the other onions that are routed to the same server, but only if the server is honest. When an onion is routed to a corrupted server, the adversary knows the internal state of the server, and so the onion does not mix with other onions. Since the adversary can corrupt up to a constant fraction of the server, at any given step, a fraction of the onions do not mix with other onions.
To prove that Π 2 achieves statistical privacy, we make the argument that every onion is routed to an honest server Ω(log 2 n) times. Moreover, there exists Ω(log 2 n) short (constant length) time intervals, such that within each of time interval, all the onions are routed to an honest server at least once. Again, we recast our problem as a balls-in-bins problem, where the balls are the onions. By letting each of the time intervals be a "meta-step, " and by letting each pair (S, t) consisting of an honest server S and a step t be a "meta-bin;" we reduce the setting for the passive adversary model to the setting for the network adversary model. 
P
. Let A be any active adversary, capable of adaptively corrupting up to ν of the servers. For concreteness, our proof below is for the case where A corrupts up to ν = 1 2 of the servers and the protocol-depth is L = 9 log 2 n steps. With overwhelming probability, each ball is routed to an honest server at least 3 log 2 n times during a protocol run (Fact 3.1b). Thus, there exists some sequence τ 1 , . . . , τ 3 log 2 n of steps, where τ t denotes the rst step after which all balls are routed to an honest server at least t times. Using the pigeonhole principle, there exists a sub-sequence of τ 1 , . . . , τ 3 log 2 n of length log 2 n, such that, for each τ i in the subsequence, τ i +1 −τ i ≤ 3. Let τ t 1 , . . . , τ t log 2 n be this sub-sequence. For each i ∈ [log 2 n], let the time interval T i = [τ t i , τ t i +1 ) be a metastep. For every meta-step T i , let the pair (S, t) be a meta-bin within T i , whenever S is an honest server, and t is a time step within T i .
Within every meta-step T i , every ball is routed to an honest server at least once. If the ball visits exactly one meta-bin, we let the ball be "thrown into" the visited meta-bin. If the ball visits more than one meta-bin within T i , we let the ball be thrown into a metabin chosen uniformly at random from the set of visited meta-bins. Note that, in our described meta balls-in-bins settings, at every meta-step, every ball is thrown into a meta-bin independently and uniformly at random; since each hop of an onion route is chosen uniformly from [n] and independently of other factors.
Even if the balls were mixed only by being thrown into metabins and only at meta-steps, since the number of meta-bins within a meta-step is linear in n, statistical privacy is achieved after log 2 n meta-steps (Theorem 5.1). Since only more mixing can occur in an actual protocol run of Π 2 , this proves that Π 2 is statistically-private after 9 log 2 n steps. By choosing appropriate constant factors, it can be shown that the result holds more generally when the adversary corrupts any constant ν ∈ [0, 1) fraction of the servers, and when the protocol-depth is set to any L = Ω(log 2 n). The full proof will be provided in an extended paper.
SECURITY AGAINST ACTIVE ADVERSARIES
The two constructions Π 1 and Π 2 , presented in the previous sections, were shown to be secure against a network or a passive adversary. Despite making the conservative assumption that the adversary has global view of the network tra c, security against a network adversary does not provide a strong enough security guarantee in an ad-hoc distributed network anyone can join. To address this point, this section is devoted to a solution which is provably secure against active adversaries.
Our construction
In contrast to the presentation in the earlier section, in the following, we make no distinction between a user and a server. We denote by P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, the set of n parties participating in a protocol. We let ν ∈ [0, 1) denote the fraction of corrupted players in the network; κ = 1 − ν , the fraction of uncorrupted players; and F , a pseudorandom function (PRF). We describe the protocol for inputs where each user is sending at most one message to one other user, but the protocol easily extends to any input set. Before a protocol run, each player P i ∈ P generates a random number of onions. Every generated onion has a total of L = β log 2 n intermediary layers for some protocol-speci ed constant β > 0, and the destinations for all intermediary hops are chosen independently and uniformly at random. If P i is conversing, it creates one real onion carrying a message m for the intended recipient P j ; i.e., the innermost layer of a real onion contains an encryption of m along with the id of the intended recipient. The rest of the onions are noise (or dummy) onions, i.e., each onion contains an encryption of the special message ⊥ for a random location. (If P i is not conversing, all onions are noise onions.) 7
Let r denote the round number. For every index j ∈ [n], player P i computes F (sk i, j , r ), where sk i, j denotes the shared secret key between players P i and P j , and generates an onion if the output of the PRF is equivalent to 1. For every created onion, P i additionally computes τ ≡ F (sk i, j , r +1), b ≡ F (sk i, j , r +2), and c = F (sk i, j , r +3). The recipient of the τ -th layer is set to P b , and an additional information ( e point, c) is embedded into the τ -layer. Note that if F (sk i, j , r ) ≡ 1, both P i and P j each create one part of a mated onion pair, each having a checkpoint with the nonce c at step τ and location b.
All onions are released simultaneously at the beginning of the protocol run. At every step of the protocol, each player P i checks to see whether it has already aborted the protocol. If P i has not yet aborted, it rst decides whether to abort at this step. It decrypts each onion and counts the number of onions with a missing checkpoint mate. If this number exceeds a threshold T 0 , or if the number of abort messages received at this step exceedsT 1 , P i aborts the protocol. If P i aborts (or aborted at an earlier step), it sends Γ log 2 n abort messages, each message addressed to an independently and uniformly random player, where Γ > 0 is some protocol-speci ed constant. Otherwise, if both checks pass, P i , sends out the onions it has in random order. Finally, if P i receives onions at the nal step, it decrypts the onions to nd an intended message, see Algorithms 5 and 6. Clearly, Π 3 is correct; any real message that is not dropped by the adversary is received by its intended recipient.
The PRF F is used for determining whether a noise onion is created, and, if so, the step number, location, and nonce of its checkpoint. While we do not specify the moduli in the protocol description, it is understood that the appropriate moduli are chosen such that every player creates α log 4 n noise onions in expectation (i.e., the expected value of k in Algorithm 5 is α log 4 n) for some protocolspeci ed constant α > 0, and, without knowledge of the shared secret key used in to key F , the time step and location appear to be chosen uniformly and independently at random from [L] and [n], respectively.
Proof of security
In the active adversary model, the adversary A can drop or replace onions, or inject new onions on-the-y. Thus, Π 2 is not secure against an active adversary who corrupts a constant fraction of the servers, because A can drop the onion originating from any target sender U at the rst hop and observe who does not receive an onion with high probability. This leaks with whom P is conversing.
Protocol Π 3 is secure against such attacks, because every honest player generates many noise onions, creating cover. The adversary A can drop any fraction (including all) of the noise onions, but the threshold checks T 0 and T 1 in Π 3 ensure that each honest player can independently and reliably determine when too many noise onions have been dropped. This, we prove in Lemma 6.3. From this guarantee, if an honest player does not abort the protocol at step t, then A cannot have eliminated some constant fraction of the noise onions at step t −1 with overwhelming probability. In Theorem 6.4, we show that the fraction of the noise onions that reach step t − 1 is enough for keeping the input di erentially-private. Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 are used for proving Lemma 6.3.
Algorithm 5 Procedure for a client P i in a conversation with client P j . if F (sk i,i ′, r ) ≡ 1 then 5: if conversing, and i ′ = r then // If conversing, choose random onion to carry message 21: T L = S j ; e L = m Send all onions to their respective rst hops in random order 34:
Upon receiving an encrypted messages, decrypt all messages 35: end procedure L 6.1. Let T ∈ (0, 1) be any positive constant strictly less than 1. Let U be a set of 2u balls, comprised of u distinct pairs of balls; and let V ⊂ U be a random size 2 = 2T ′ u subset of U , where T ′ ∈ (0,T ].
For any d ∈ (0, 1), the probability that the fraction c T ′ of matched pairs in V exceeds if status is not aborted then 3: for all received onion e do // Decrypt all onions received in the current step 4: e ′ = Dec(sk S i , e) 5: end for 6: if the number of missing checkpoint mates exceeds T 0 then 7:
Abort the protocol 8: Send Γ log 2 n abort messages to random players 9: else if total number of abort messages received exceeds T 1 then 10:
Abort the protocol 11: Send Γ log 2 n abort messages to random players 12: end if 13: Send the peeled onions to their labeled destinations in random order 14: else 15: Send Γ log 2 n abort messages to random players 16: end if 17: end procedure the indicator random variable X i is 1 when both balls in i-th pairtype are in V ; otherwise, X i is 0. For any i ∈ [u],
since there are 2u−2 2 −2 ways to choose 2 − 2 balls from 2u − 2 balls; and likewise, there are 2u 2 ways of choosing 2 balls from 2u balls.
from the linearity of expectation. We recast the problem in terms of a martingale. For each i ∈ [ ], let Y i be the i-th ball chosen to belong in V , and let
Thus, the sequence of random variables Z 1 , . . . , Z is a Doob martingale by construction. Moreover, we can think of w T as a function of the balls in V that satis es the Lipschitz condition with bound 1, since changing out a ball in the set for a di erent ball outside the set can only change w by at most 1.
Thus, we may apply the Azuma-Hoe ding inequality to show that w T exceeds (1 + d) · E[w T ] with only negligible probability:
This proves that the probability that c T exceeds (1 + d) · E[c T ] is negligibly small. Case 2: 0 < T ′ < T . From Case 1, the probability that c T ′ exceeds
This completes our proof. L 6.2. Let T ∈ (0, 1) be any positive constant strictly less than 1. Let U be a set of 2u balls, comprised of u = Ω(n log 4 n) distinct pairs of balls; and let V ⊂ U be a random size 2 = 2T ′ u subset of U , where T ′ ∈ (0,T ].
For any positive constant β > 0, and for any d 0 , d 1 ∈ (0, 1); if V 's unpaired balls are distributed randomly into βn log 2 n bins, each bin contains at least
unmatched balls with overwhelming probability (in n), where
and where E[c T ] = 2T u−1 2u−1 denotes the expected fraction of matched balls in V when T ′ = T .
P
. From Lemma 6.1, the fraction c T ′ of matched balls in V is at most (1 +d 1 ) · E[c T ] with overwhelming probability. Thus, the number of unpaired balls in V is at least 2(1 − (1 + d 1 
with overwhelming probability. Since = γn log 4 n for some positive constant γ > 0, we can use a Cherno bound to show that the probability that any bin receives less than
For all i ∈ [βn log 2 n], let O i denote the number of balls in bin i. The probability that the number of balls in a xed bin i ∈ [βn log 2 n] is signi cantly more or less than the expected number of balls can be bounded by a Cherno bound [20, :
So, by the union bound, the probability that any bin has signicantly more or less than the expected number of balls is negligible in n. L 6.3. For any c 0 , c 1 ,T ∈ (0, 1), such that T > ν + c 0 + c 1 , and for any d 0 ,
and where u = (1 − d 2 )ακ 3 n log 4 n; if T 1 = c 1 Γ log 2 n; if F is a truly random; and if any honest player does not abort at step t ∈ [L] of the protocol run; then, with overwhelming probability, at least (1−c 0 )(1− d 3 )κ of the noise onions created between honest players survive step t −1, even in the presence of an active adversary adaptively corrupting a constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network.
. Let A be any active adversary, capable of adaptively corrupting a constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network.
Consider only onion pairs created between two honest players. Given a pair of onions with the checkpoint in the future, if one of the two onions is eliminated, the probability that the adversary A can create a replacement onion that properly matches the surviving onion is negligibly small. Even with a non-negligible probability of guessing the correct step and location of the checkpoint, A cannot produce the correct checkpoint nonce with su ciently high probability.
Suppose a dark angel marks all onions with a checkpoint at a corrupted player so that the adversary can replace these onions without detection. Even so, without A eliminating some unmarked onions, some positive fraction of the onion pairs survive (Fact 3.1b).
Let u denote the total number of unmarked onion pairs. Again relying on Cherno bounds (Fact 3.1b), u is at least (1−d 2 )ακ 3 n log 4 n with overwhelming probability. (These are the noise onions created between honest players with checkpoints at an honest location.)
Since the adversary A does not know how the onions are paired, no matter what it chooses to do, the locations of each matched pair of onions are random with respect to A's actions. Let t denote half of the cumulative number of eliminated unmarked onions at step t < L. If an honest player does not detect more than
unmatched checkpoint onions at step t, then either t −1 ≤ c 0 u with overwhelming probability, or t −1 > Tu (contrapositive of Lemma 6.2). However, if t −1 > Tu, the honest players would have detected too many unmatched checkpoint onions at an earlier step: No more than (1+d)c 1 u honest players can have aborted in the previous step t − 1, since, otherwise, every honest player would have received at least c 1 Γ log 2 n abort messages at step t and would have aborted. So, the adversary can only directly eliminate up to (1 + d)ν of the total unmarked onions per step and indirectly (through aborting honest players) eliminate (1 + d)c 1 u of the total unmarked onions per step (Fact 3.1b). Thus, there would exist some earlier step t ′ < t, such that c 0 u ≤ t ′ ≤ Tu.
Since t −1 ≤ c 0 u, at least 1 − c 0 of the unmarked onions (i.e., (1−c 0 )(1−d 3 )κ of all noise onions created between honest players) survive until step t − 1 with overwhelming probability. T 6.4. For any c 0 , c 1 ,T ∈ (0, 1), such that T > ν + c 0 + c 1 , and for any d 0 ,
and if F is a truly random function; then, for su ciently large n, Π 3 provides (ϵ, δ )-DP against an active adversary capable of corrupting a constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network on any input set Σ.
P . The proof is by cases. Consider only onion pairs created between two honest players.
Case 1: In the simplest case, all honest players abort early in the protocol run, and so, with overwhelming probability, no onion survives the protocol run. Thus, the adversary learns nothing, since the adversary's view is independent from the input vector. Case 2: There exists a step t − 1 = Θ(log 2 n), such that an honest player does not abort the protocol at step t. In this case, we prove that even if the adversary A were provided with the remaining path from step t to L of every surviving onion, the input to the protocol would remain di erentially private.
For any two neighboring inputs σ 0 and σ 1 , the only di erence between the two scenarios is the nal hop of just one onion O. The two views V A, Π 3 (σ 0 ) and V A, Π 3 (σ 1 ) are identical except that O is routed to P r in V A, Π 3 (σ 0 ) and to P ′ r in V A, Π 3 (σ 1 ). WLOG, let P r and P ′ r both be intended recipients; P r is an intended recipient in V A, Π 3 (σ 0 ), and P ′ r is an intended recipient in V A, Π 3 (σ 1 ). Case 2a: Let A be any active adversary, capable of adaptively corrupting a fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network. Further assume that A does not drop any more onions in the remaining steps (from step t to L). Since at least ω(n log 2 n) onions survive every step until t − 1, the onions are no longer linked to their senders by this step (Theorem 5.2). Since the number of onions sent out by each sender is independent of the input, and the onions are no longer linked to their senders at step t − 1; the only potentially useful information available to A is the volumes of received onions at recipient P r and at P ′ r . For every recipient P, a portion of the noise onions it receives can be modeled by a binomial random variable X ∼ Binomial(M, p),
, α log 4 n n 2 ]. (P may receive more noise onions, but these onions only further increase the variation, since the recipient of every noise onion is chosen independently at random.) This follows since at least one onion (actually two onions) are created with probability .
for su ciently large n, and 1 + ϵ 2 ≤ e ϵ /2 whenever ϵ ≥ 0. Thus, for every outcome i ∈ E 1 ,
Let E 2 be the complement of E 1 ; it is the tail event such that [20, Cors. 4.6] ,
(Moreover, for any d > 0, the probability of E 2 is negligible in n.) Let E 3 be the event (unconditioned on the input vector) where the number of noise onions at P r or at P ′ r deviates from the expected volume Mp by more than dMp. From the union bound and (3), the probability of E 3 is bounded above by δ .
Let E 4 be the complement of E 3 ; it is the event where both volumes of noise onions are within dMp of the expected volume Mp.
Since every event V can be decomposed into two subsets V 1 and
Case 2b: The adversary A drops some number of onions in any arbitrarily fashion in the remaining steps t through L. The protocol achieves di erential privacy, since the adversary's view can be thought of as a lter on the view it would have had, if no onions were dropped in the remaining steps (Case 2a, Post-Processing theorem for di erential privacy [13, Proposition 2.1]).
ONION ROUTING IN THE REAL WORLD
In Theorem 6.4 we proved that Π 3 achieves di erential privacy when the onions were constructed using idealized (informationtheoretically secure) public-key encryption, and when the function F for generating checkpoint onions is truly random. Such idealized encryption does not exist, and truly random functions are not available, either. So our actual proposed solution is to use standard computationally secure tools instead. In this case, Π 3 achieves the computational analogue:
For any c 0 , c 1 ,T ∈ (0, 1), such that T > ν + c 0 + c 1 , and for any d 0 ,
and where u = (1 − d 2 )ακ 3 n log 4 n; if T 1 = c 1 Γ log 2 n, if F be a PRF; and if Π 3 is constructed using a CCA2-secure encryption scheme and a pseudorandom function F ; then, for any ϵ and for any δ that is negligible in the security parameter, the protocol provides ϵ-IND-CDP privacy against an active adversary capable of (non-adaptively) corrupting a constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the network on any input set Σ.
P
. The proof is by a relatively standard hybrid argument; here we present it in the language of Canetti's universal composability [3] . Let F enc be an ideal public-key encryption functionality and F PRF be an ideal pseudorandom function functionality.
Recall that a CCA2-secure cryptosystem UC-realizes the (nonadaptive) F enc functionality, while a secure PRF UC-realizes the F PRF functionality. That means that (1) there exist simulators S enc and S PRF that, in combination with F enc and F PRF , respectively, realize idealized non-adaptive public-key encryption and a pseudorandom function, respectively. Moreover, (2) for any PPT environment and adversary, the view that the adversary obtains in the (F enc , F PRF )-hybrid model with these simulators is indistinguishable from its view when the CCA2 scheme and the PRF are used instead.
Let {σ 0, λ } and {σ 1, λ } be a sequence of neighboring inputs to Π 3 , parameterized by the security parameter λ, and let A be a nonuniform PPT adversary. By V A, Π ideal (σ b, λ ) let us denote A's view in the protocol Π with input σ b, λ where the encryption and PRF are realized using their ideal functionalities with the simulators. By V A, Π real (σ b, λ ), let us denote the corresponding view where they are realized using the CCA2 encryption scheme and the PRF.
Using (1), by Theorem 6.4, Π 3 provides (ϵ, δ )-DP privacy when the encryption and the PRF are realized using the simulator with F enc and F PRF , and so
. Putting the two together, and keeping in mind that δ is negligible in λ, we get the theorem. 10 ; and let F be a PRF. If Π 3 is constructed using a CCA2-secure encryption scheme, the protocol provides ϵ-IND-CDP privacy against an active adversary capable of (non-adaptively) corrupting k = 1 2 of the network on any input set Σ.
Deriving pairwise PRF keys using a PKI
Recall that Π 3 requires that any pair of clients, P i and P j , are in possession of a shared PRF key sk i, j . What would be more desirable is if they could derive a shared PRF key using the public-key infrastructure.
Under the decisional Di e-Hellman assumption, in the non-adaptive corruption setting this can be accomplished as follows. Let be a generator of a group G of order q in which the decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds; and suppose that these are publicly available. Let a random x i ∈ Z q be part of every P i 's secret key, and let Y i = x i be part of P i 's public key. Then,
j can serve as a PRF key for an appropriate choice of a PRF F ′ , namely, one that is a PRF when the seed is chosen as a random element of the group G. For example, using the leftover hash lemma [16] , we can use F ′
where H is a universal hash function, and F * is any PRF.
To sum it up, our proposed construction for how P i computes the shared PRF for P j on input a is:
x i ∈ Z q is part of P i 's secret key, Y j = x j is part of P j 's public key, and F ′ is any PRF keyed by random elements of G.
To show that no PPT adversary can distinguish whether (Case A) all honest P i and P j are using this construction or (Case B) a truly random function, we will use a standard hybrid argument.
Consider the hybrid experiment E H in which all honest pairs P i and P j have a truly random s i, j ∈ G, and use it as a seed to F ′ . It is straightforward to see that an adversary distinguishing this experiment from Case B breaks the PRF F ′ .
Suppose that we have N ′ honest clients. So now consider a series of experiments E 0 , . . . , E ( N ′ 2 )
in which the honest pairs of clients are ordered in some fashion, and the rst u pairs will use truly random seeds s i, j while the rest compute s i, j = Y x i j = Y x j i . Since E 0 is identical to E H above, and E ( N ′ 2 )
is identical to Case A, by the hybrid argument it is su cient to show that, for every u, no adversary can distinguish E u from E u+1 . Our reduction is given a decisional Di e-Hellman challenge ( , A, B, C) = ( , α , β , γ ) and needs to distinguish whether γ = α β or random. Let P I and P be the (u + 1) st pair of honest clients. Let Y I = A and Y = B, and for all the other P i , let Y i = x i for some x i that the reduction knows. For the rst u pairs of honest clients, P i and P j , let s i, j be a truly random PRF seed picked by the reduction. When the adversary queries for F (sk i , pk j , a), the reduction responds with F ′ s i, j (a) whenever (P i , P j ) are among the rst u pairs, with F ′ Z i, j (a) if they are among the last N ′ 2 − u − 1 pairs, where Z i, j = Y x j i and the reduction knows, WLOG, x j , and with F ′ C (a) if i = I and j = . If γ = α β, then the view the adversary gets is identical to E u ; but if it is random, then it is identical to E u+1 . This completes the proof.
OPTIMALITY OF OUR RESULTS
Our proposed protocols Π 2 and Π 3 di er from today's implementation of Tor in several important ways. In this section, we explain why these changes were needed. Polylog depth. Protocol Π 1 relies on padding (with dummy server onions) to sever links between sent-onions and received-onions in only a constant number of rounds. While Π 1 provides statistically privacy against network adversaries, no e cient construction of constant depth, including today's Tor, can provide security against a passive adversary capable of corrupting a constant fraction of the network. This is because, in a protocol run with logarithmic (in the network size) number of rounds, there is a non-negligible probability that a group of onions is routed to a corrupted party in the rst step and stays within the sub-network of corrupted nodes untilnally being delivered to their destinations. Thus, without using an ine cient number of dummy onions (e.g., broadcasting), we have a linkability problem. Therefore, T 8.1. No e cient logarithmic-depth onion-routing protocol can be made secure against a passive adversary capable of nonadaptively corrupting a constant fraction of the network.
Dummy onions.
For an e cient Tor-like protocol to be secure against passive adversaries capable of corrupting a constant fraction of the network, it must have more than logarithmic depth (Thms. 8.1). In Section 5, we showed that with poly-logarithmic depth, a Tor-like protocol, Π 2 , can be made secure against passive adversaries.
To be secure against active adversaries capable of corrupting a constant fraction of the network, even more structure is required. While Tor does not speci cally make any recommendation to use dummy onions; they are required for achieving di erential privacy (and, therefore, statistical privacy) against an active adversary capable of corrupting a non-negligible portion of the network.
We can show that this is true from the following argument: In every case where an honest sender's onion is sent directly to the recipient without traversing an intermediary hop, the adversary 12 can observe who receives this onion. This creates a link between a user and its correspondent. However, if there exists an honest user whose onion traverses (a) randomly chosen intermediary hop(s), then the adversary may drop the onion at the rst hop with nonnegligible probability; this can occur when the randomly chosen hop is a corrupted node. 3 In such case, the adversary may otherwise follow the protocol and observe the volume of onions received by every user. With auxiliary information, e.g., if the adversary knows that every user is conversing with at most one user, the adversary may learn something about the input vector. Therefore, T 8.2. Without dummy onions, no onion-routing protocol can be made di erentially-private against an active adversary capable of non-adaptively corrupting a constant fraction of the network.
Paired onions. Without paired onions and threshold checks, Π 3 might not provide privacy from active adversaries. This is because an active adversary may target an honest player by dropping onions that are more likely to have originated from the target than from any other player. Without some guarantee on the volume of noise onions that survive (until at least some portion of the protocol), it may be possible for the adversary to link the target sender to its correspondent with non-negligible probability.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented several anonymity protocols, all e cient and provably secure under standard adversary models. Our main construction, Π 3 , is secure against an active adversary in control of a constant fraction ν ∈ [0, 1) of the nodes and with a global view of all tra c on all links in the network. It relies on a new technique for detecting when too many of the protocol's onions have been dropped and possibly replaced.
In this paper, we modeled the network as a synchronous and stable complete graph. A natural direction for future work is to extend the results of this paper for asynchronous systems and or systems with high churn.
